Theseus's ship sails the seas. As its timbers age, they are replaced with new ones. The old timbers are kept, restored and combined to form a ship. Call the original ship 'A', the ship that had all its timbers replaced, 'B', and the ship that was, at the end of the story, made from the original planks, 'C'.
The individuation conditions we associate with 'ship' entail that A is the same ship as B and that A is the same ship as C. But B is not the same ship as C. So 'x is the same ship as y' extends over <A, B> and over <A, C>, but not over <B, C>. The whole notion of extension is kaput.
Challenge 3:
Like ships like people. Individuals A and B are in the hands of a mad scientist. She explains that she has an apparatus that will copy all the information in A's brain into B's and vice versa.
3 After that, one person will receive a million pounds and the other will be tortured. Call the person whose body is A's body at T1, the "A-body-person-at-T1", the person whose body is B's body at T1, the "B-body-person-at-T1", etc.. Then we have this picture:
T1 info transfer at T2 T3
A-body-person-at-T1 ----------------------------------A-body-person-at-T3 B-body-person-at-T1 ----------------------------------B-body-person-at-T3
The scientist asks B to decide which body-person will be tortured and which will receive the million pounds. 4 An utterance of (1) could easily be true.
(1) John gave a book to Mary, but she already had it, so he read it himself then shredded it.
But then 'book' extends over objects that are both abstract and concrete and 'it' refers to something that is both abstract and concrete. 5 But nothing is both abstract and concrete. So the ideas of extension and reference are kaput.
Challenge 5:
An utterance of (2) could be true.
(2) The average American family has 2.3 children.
But traditional semantic theory is committed to treating the sentence as having something like the form partially depicted in (2*):
(2*) (∃x)(family(x) & average-for-American(x) & has <2.3 children, x>))
And utterances of (2*) are, if meaningful at all, then false.
Similarly, an utterance of (3) could be true:
(3) Joe Sixpack's priorities are changing But according to traditional semantics, all such utterances should be false since the proper name doesn't refer.
Likewise for (4) and (5): (4) Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective (5) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective And (6) too, because traditional semantics treats 'some' as an existential quantifier, implying real-world existence:
(6) Some fictional detectives are more famous than any real detective And finally:
There is a flaw in the argument.
An utterance of (7) could be true. According to the traditionalist, this could only be so if flaws were things. But they are not.
6
The problems we have with the individuation of the denizens of the manifest image: ships, water, books, people and so on might lead one to think of the manifest image as 'a dream modulated by sensory input.' 7 (Llinas 1987 , quoted with approval in Chomsky 1995 . According to Chomsky, all these problems go away if we refrain from thinking of manifest kinds and particulars as real-world objects. They are not things out there for our commonsense words and concepts to extend over or refer to.
Real kinds and particulars are to be found only in the scientific image. 8 And there is no overlap between the two. It is, according to Chomsky, ok to say things like 'books exist and so do people, but unicorns don't' using ordinary 6 Chomsky (1981 324) ., Hornstein (1984 58) . 7 The actual quote is 'perception is a dream modulated by sensory input, from Llinas 1987. 8 The expressions 'manifest image' and 'scientific image' are from Sellars (1962) . I don't think Chomsky uses the terms. But they are apt.
language. In Wittgensteinian spirit: language is alright as it is. But this is a relatively non-committal usage ('without metaphysical import'). It would not do, for example, to translate the claim into (8) and then give it a standard semantics:
For Chomsky "the semantic properties of an expression focus attention on selected aspects of the world as it is taken to be by other cognitive systems, and provide intricate and highly specialized perspectives from which to view them, crucially involving human interests and concerns even in the simplest cases." For example if I am inside a house I can clean it, affecting the inside, but I cannot see it, unless an exterior surface is visible.
And if I am inside it, I cannot be near it, even though, in the unmarked case, it is surface (like a cube, to which the same point applies). The semantic properties of an expression provide "instructions" to "conceptualintentional" systems for building up these intricate representations, which can then be used to interpret speech acts. (Chomsky 2005, 20 (9) Fred can reach it. He is tall.
Compare (9) with (10) Malt (1994) for an empirical study of some of the uses of 'water'. Szabo (2006) denies that 'water' shifts its extension in the way Chomsky claims it does. Responding to Chomsky's example, he writes: "I disagree: I think many of us would be reluctant to stand by both judgments upon learning the chemist's verdict [that the stuff coming out of the tap and tea in a tea cup are chemically indistinguishable]; we might not know which one to give up, but that does not mean that they must have the same standing." I disagree: most of my informants are happy with both judgments.
13 Could 'c' work like a special kind of indexical, such that understanding its use in a specific context entails knowing what the relevant parameter is, under the right description? Could 'tall[c]' mean, something like 'tall for this context', where one is only in a position to understand 'this context' if one knows what it is to be tall for the context? I doubt it very much. Suppose that you are in the supermarket in Beijing and you encounter the group of friends. You haven't met them before. But you have had a few words with them about the shop and its goods. You are part of the conversation, when one of them says (9). You are blind and you don't know how tall the friends are. Then you understand (9) in the manner of 'He is tall for this context'. But you don't know what it is to be tall for the context. So you don't understand (9) in the way the speaker and the other participants do. You don't know which thought the utterance expresses. 14 Any attempt to extend the variable approach will have to contend with many different kinds of parameter. Consider for example an utterance of 'the shoes are under the bed' when they are eight floors below. And, for another, 'the door must be kept shut at all times', which sometimes means: except when you are passing through it, and sometimes doesn't. Thanks to Travis for both. 15 Rothschild and Segal have other arguments against the extra-variable approach. (11) If u is an utterance of 'that is a watermelon', and the speaker uses 'that' in u to refer to x, then u is true iff x satisfies 'is a watermelon'.
The information specified in (11) is context-independent. Now suppose that you are in a particular context of utterance and you know that the speaker used 'that' to refer to watermelon α, then you can move on to (12):
(12) u is true iff α is a watermelon.
The extension of the basic idea to predicates, not an entirely straightforward affair, proceeds as follows. not by the standards of the Dutch context", we are using "tall" in a rather abstract and general way. This is how we use "tall" when we are theorizing about height in general and related matters. Let us call this "tall g " (the gth context is the general one).
Putting these ideas together we get:
(A1) (x)(n)(x satisfies "Fred", c n iff x=Fred) (A2) (x)(n)(x satisfies "is tall"^n, c n iff x is tall g , c n )
16
(A3) (S)(NP)(VP)(If S=NP^VP, then ((n)(S is true, c n iff (∃x)(x satisfies NP, c n and x satisfies VP, c n ))) 17 (A4) (u)(n)(S) (if u is an utterance of S in c n , then (u is true iff S is true, c n )) 16 For all x, for all n, x satisfies the expression composed of 'is tall' concatenated with the nth index relative to the nth context iff x is tall by the standards of the nth context. 17 For any sentence S, any noun phrase NP and any verb phrase VP, if S is the concatenation of NP and VP, then, for any n, S is true relative to the nth context iff for some x, x satisfies NP relative to the nth context and x satisfies VP relative to the nth context. (A5) u k is an utterance of S k = 'Fred is tall k ' in c k (A6) (x)(x is tall g , c k iff x is tall k )
You can then combine the T-theory with the contextual information to get you to:
(A7) u k is true iff (∃x)(x=Fred x is tall k )
From which you might infer: pick out the mind, or the human being? Does 'Fred' pick out the mind, or the human being? The lack of agreement amongst philosophers about these issues suggests that the answer is: "it is indeterminate". It is indeterminate whether Fred is the A-body-person-at-T3 or the B-body-person-at-T3.
I used to think that that meant that it was then open to each of us to choose which concept we wished to express by 'person' (and 'self') and which object one would pick out with 'I'. And I want to be a mind. If I were the Bbody-person-at-T1, I would want the A-body-person-at-T3 to get the reward.
But I no longer think I can choose to be a mind. If it is indeterminate whether I am a mind or a human being, then I can't resolve the indeterminacy by ditching my old concept of self and replacing it with the slightly physicalist concept of a mind. The human being is a thinking thing, just as the mind is. And it can't choose to be other than it is. Equally the mind already is the mind, and it doesn't need to make a choice in order to be self-identical. 'hammer', 'dog' and 'tooth'. Supervaluationism can make sense of our quotidian use of these terms.
Books
(1) means something like (1'):
(1') John bought [(a copy of) [a book] i ] j for Mary. But Mary already had (a copy of) it i . So he read it j then shredded it j But then nothing in the logical form of (1) needs to extend over anything that is both abstract and concrete. Sometimes 'book' extends over abstract things, and sometimes it extends over concrete things. Likewise some occurrences of 'it' that are anaphoric on 'book' refer to abstract objects and others refer to concrete ones. But no occurrence of 'book' or 'it' extends over anything that is both abstract and concrete. In (1) 'book' extends over book types, which are abstract. (Peter had already bought it for her, which is why she already had it.) The first 'it' refers to the type. The second and third refer to a concrete thing, the copy that John bought, read and shredded.
I don't know how to get the meaning expressed in (1') out of (1). I don't know what the logical form of (1) is. I have no argument that it looks like
(1'). But, as far as I can see, the problem of how to get the meaning (1') out of (1) remains whether one is doing truth-theoretic semantics or describing instructions to the conceptual-intentional systems. And there is no apparent reason to suppose that the problem would be any easier to solve if embedded in the latter enterprise. 20 Chomsky (p.c.) has objected to this proposal. Suppose I am holding a book and say (13): (13) This book won the Pulitzer Prize
The traditional semantic theorist has to treat 'This book' as referring both to the type and to the copy. I am not convinced. What won the prize was the type. So it is reasoanble to hold that 'this book' refers to the type. But it doesn't also have to refer to the copy. It is true that the speaker draws attention to the copy as part of the pragmatic mechanism that secures reference to the type. But that doesn't enter the semantics. 21
Nonexistents
There are three standard strategies that a semantic theorist can deploy in relation to (2)- (7): (i) posit funny objects, such as average American 20 Chomsky says very little about what a theory of instructions to conceptual-intentional systems would look like. He thinks we know very little about the matter. Paul Pietroski (Pietroski forthcoming) has sketched a small proposal about how to do Chomsky semantics. It appears to be fairly widely agreed that if Chomsky right about the nature of semantics, then a lot of what truth-theoretic theorists actually do could be recast in the theory of instructions. This looks plausible in the case of the little T-theory for 'tall' presented above. 21 The problematic phenomenon is not restricted to books, nor to an abstract/concrete duplex. We also have 'I painted the door brown then walked through it' and 'The baby finished the bottle then broke it' (both adapted from Chomsky 1995 , drawing on Pustejoski 1993 . It looks as though when two kinds of things are systematically related -figure and ground, contents and container -we can use the same term to pick out either one. Again, the response is: these phenomena are hard to explain. But as far as one can tell, they can be explained just as well within a traditional framework as within the proposed alternative.
families, existing yet fictional objects and flaws (ii) monkey around with the sentence's logical forms in an effort to show that the apparent ontological commitment disappears under analysis, (iii) adopt a fictionalist approach, according to which utterances of the sentences are not literally true, but they relate in appropriate ways to thoughts that are literally true. I think that (i) offers a plausible account of (7) and (iii) offers a plausible account of (3)- (6). (2), though, requires more extended discussion, as follows.
(2) can appear extremely problematic for a traditional semantic theory because none of (i)-(iii) look promising. The matter deserves some discussion.
Notice first that there is an innocent and relatively unproblematic use of the 'the average American':
(14) The average American is concerned about falling fertility rates.
Here the 'the' is generic 'the', as in 'the tiger likes to hunt at night' and 'average' just means: typical (Stanley 2001 , Higginbotham 1985 . This use of 'the average' appears to be different from 'the average' in (2). Consider One virtue of his account is that it explains the contrast between (16) and (17) But we can't.
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Is semantics for natural language doomed, then, by this whacky construction? Of course not. The construction isn't one of natural language.
It comes from the science of statistics. I assume 'average' here has to mean either median or mean. But these are surely not terms of natural language, but technical terms from mathematics. 25 That is precisely why the strange 'the average' construction only works with numbers, why it appears so bizarre to the natural-language semantic theorist, and why we naturallanguage semantic theorists really don't have to worry about it at all. Phew! Moving on. I think the traditionalist could do worse than go factionalist about (3) through (6). Utterances of all of them are, strictly speaking, false. But they can be used to get across messages that might be true. I don't myself believe in non-existent objects. And I am not sanguine about the chances of discovering ontologically innocent logical forms for all of these examples or, indeed, any of them. So I want to suggest that there is nothing wrong with a fictionalist approach to these examples.
We often say things that are literally false in order to communicate something that we take to be true. Sometimes there are Gricean mechanisms that explain how the process works. And I think something roughly like a Gricean account works for (3).When we say (3) ('Joe Sixpack's priorities are changing') isn't it obvious that we are pretending to refer to a man who is typical of a certain kind of individual? It is only a pretence and so what we say isn't literally true. (3) is a device we use to convey something we take to be true, something along the lines of: the priorities of most typical lowerclass American men are changing. I don't suppose that there is any specific 25 Statisticians also use the expression 'the median American family'. I suspect that 'the average American family' is simply a variant form of that, since the expression is most naturally interpreted as talking about the median. However, a median number of children can't be 2.3. So perhaps sometimes 'the average American family' means: the mean American family. I am not sure where the '2.3' example comes from. It might be a linguist's invention rather than something taken from a real statistical report. Perhaps we should stick with '2.5'. true thought is conveyed by an utterance of (3). But there are a range of very thoughts all of which capture the same gist.
'Joe Sixpack' seems to me to have a fairly obvious air of pretence about it. On the other hand, 'Sherlock Holmes' in serious uses like (4) and (5) ('Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective', 'Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective') and 'some fictional detectives' in (6) ('Some fictional detectives are more famous than any real detective') don't.
Intuitively (4), (5) and (6) seem to be literally true. I suggest that this is because we intuitively believe that fictional characters exist (real ones, not
Joe Sixpack) -not in the natural world but in some realm of fiction. The realm of fiction really exists and so do the characters that occupy it. And we can think about them and refer to them. We believe this intuitively. But on reflection we should give these beliefs up.
So I propose an error theory for (4), (5) and (6). If we say these things, we unintentionally speak falsely. But it doesn't matter, because there are truths that we are gesturing at. Let us call the idea that the universe contains a realm of fictional characters the 'meta-fiction'. According the meta-fiction, Sherlock Holmes really exists and really has properties, such as being the creation of Conan Doyle and being very famous. (He fictionally, but not really, has properties such as being a detective and being nearly as smart as Mycroft). Then we can express the truths gestured at by (4), (5) and (6), by (4'), (5') and (6') respectively: (4') It is meta-fictionally the case that Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective (5') It is meta-fictionally the case that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character
